Four Decades of Educational Planning: 
Retrospect and Prospect

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Directions in Educational Planning: A Symposium to Honour the work of

Françoise Caillods

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Introduction

Francoise Caillods and I have been both observers and participants in many of the changes that have shaped educational planning over the last four decades. Francoise has written widely on many aspects of education and development including labour markets and productivity; costs and finance of EFA; investment in secondary schooling; privatisation; school mapping; teacher utilisation; and HIV/AIDS. Her contributions have been influential and widely disseminated since the 1970s. Countless students have passed through the IIEP training programme she has been associated with for so many years. And she has contributed lasting a body of work to the literature on educational planning that will stand the test of time.

This paper is written for the Symposium to honour Francoise’s work. The first section reflects selectively on some of the changes that have shaped educational planning since the 1960s. The second section introduces two collaborations I have had with Francoise. These were built around programmes of research that would not have happened without her enthusiastic commitment, contributions and support. They raise issues that remain critical to education and development. The final section highlights some of the current trends and issues that are likely to influence educational planning in the next decade.

A Short and Partial History of Educational Planning

Francoise joined IIEP in 1969. At this time in the UK, educational planning in relation to developing countries was seen as a largely technocratic exercise of “getting the numbers right” and matching post colonial aspirations with the resources to bring about desired outcomes. British colonial educational planning in the 1950s and 1960s had been preoccupied with the implications of decolonisation that flowed from Prime Minister MacMillan’s “winds of change” speech in Cape Town in 1961. This set the scene for the rapid deconstruction of empire. Educational planning at the time was mostly concerned with anticipating independence and meeting needs to replace expatriates though managed expansion of access to secondary and higher education for the minority destined for modern sector jobs and the civil service. After independence many countries embraced populist politics and embarked on rapid educational expansion, often with the ambition to universalise access to primary education. This was promoted by the UNESCO conferences of the early 1960s in Santiago, Addis Ababa, and Delhi. International efforts to promote UPE have a long history which continues to this day, sometime repeating itself. The Consortium for Research on Educational Access, Transitions and Equity is exploring how both the political economy
of EFA and the dynamics of system change have interacted to generate sustained success with UPE in some countries, and cycles of progress and regress in others\(^1\).

Sometime in the 1960's development planning began to come of age. In the 1950’s, at least in the Anglophone world, development orthodoxy held that a central problem of development was that there were shortages of capital that inhibited “take off” towards sustained growth (Rostow 1960). Ideas began to shift and place investment in human capital centre stage, not least because of the obvious sense in which injections of capital without the capability to translate it into higher levels of productivity created bottlenecks. Seminal work by Dennison, Becker, Harbison and Myers, Marshall, Vaizey, and others located the causes of economic growth partly in investment in education and training and the knowledge and skill they engendered. Indices of human resource development correlated with wealth and growth and it was argued that the relationships were causal. The development of one strand of the economics of education by Mark Blaug (1972) placed the accumulation of knowledge and skill at the heart of development, and investment in education was seen as what would now be called a key “driver of change”. The “residual”, i.e. that part of growth not explained by changes in land, labour and capital, really was tangible and represented a return on investment in knowledge and skill. Rates of return began to shape some educational planning.

Around this time educational planners, especially “manpower” planners, devoted much time to developing matrices of supply and demand for different categories of labour with different levels of education. “Schedules of correspondence” were invented to link the output of education systems to the kinds of jobs that were likely to become available. The “basic arithmetic of youth unemployment” began to inform perspectives on education and labour market links so that the supply of educated youth could run ahead - but not too far ahead - of demand in the modern sector labour markets of the “dual economies” of poor countries.

Some governments began to try to “pick winners” i.e. decide on sectors in which to be internationally competitive and then invest in the education and training necessary to create capacity in these sectors in the hope that this would be sufficient for success. Japan and the East Asian tigers seem to have been more successful at this than governments in other parts of the world. More generally planning was based on the idea that projections and predictions could be used to anticipate likely and desirable changes in educational demand and that incremental reforms should be adopted to balance educational outputs with future labour force needs.

A more rigid version of workforce planning, so called indicative planning, was adopted whole heartedly by centralised socialist states that saw the future clearly and which proceeded to allocate resources and direct people to education, training and into occupations that would make the utopian dream a reality. Thus China as late as the 1980s maintained a planning system that attempted to match and martial the educational histories and work opportunities of over 20 million students graduating from the school system each year with some degree of success. But it came at the price of mind boggling complexity and much inefficiency. As more orthodox internal labour markets began to develop, the benefits of freer movement of labour became apparent, and the “open door” introduced more competition in some sectors, the centralised indicative system became less and less workable.

\(^1\) See www.create-rpc.org for work in progress on this subject.
History has been cruel to indicative planning which no longer finds many acolytes amongst new generations of planners. Inevitably some politicians still have a sneaking admiration for its certainties. Some East Asian states did benefit from centrally driven and autocratic planning during early periods of rapid growth. The key role that modernising elites played in this development is perhaps underestimated. It really does matter if elites are modernising, as well as if they are autocratic. The quality of advice they receive from educational planners probably does matter, at least some of the time.

A third kind of planning that developed alongside workforce planning and indicative planning is best described as social demand planning. In this the key principle is to provide enough capacity for all those qualified and willing to take advantage of education and training to have the opportunity to enrol. This approach was little used in development planning in the 1960s and 1970s. It was however used to plan higher education in the UK. The Robbins Report of 1963, which confirmed the large scale post-war expansion of the university system, explicitly referred to the principle of social demand as a basis for growth, albeit accompanied by an undercurrent of investment in knowledge and skill to underpin Prime Minister Wilson’s “white heat of the technological revolution” that his labour government sought to promote in the 1960s.

Through the 1970s and 80s educational planning in most developing countries was grounded on the core set of propositions about the relationships between knowledge, skills, productivity, growth and economic development that are known as Human Capital Theory (HCT). This provided a powerful if often criticised framework for analysis and basis for rational choices between investment options. There was much debate around types of investment in human capital through education and training, and their impact on productivity, earnings, income distribution, and other externalities related to development (e.g. reduced fertility, improved child health and nutrition, better governance and less crime). The relationships were often different across countries and in different sectors. Labour markets in some developing countries sometimes seem so far from satisfying the assumptions on which HCT was based that some argued it had limited utility. But HCT remained the dominant set of assumptions underlying planning in most developing economies.

Increasingly the assumptions of HCT had company. Through the 1970s and into the early 1980s development thinking began to broaden to include “redistribution with growth” and make distribution and equity part of the definition of development as well as a desirable outcome (Chenery et al 1974, Seers, 1977). The related development of the “Basic Needs” approaches reinforced a sense that Rights and entitlements were becoming an essential part of any sustainable vision of development. Educational planners would have to recognise this and extend their concerns beyond balancing supply and demand to engage with broader development agendas. The economic recession of the 1980s, and the structural adjustment that it precipitated in many poor countries, fastened the process of challenging planners to devise adjustment “with a human face” (Cornia et al 1988), make a reality of “safety nets” for the poorest, and conceive of Human Development approaches that reached beyond economic well being. Capabilities approaches (Sen 1999) extend the range further to include freedoms and rights, including the right to access to education enshrined in the UN Charter.

But HCT, and its sister, rates of return (ROR) analysis, remained influential. In the late ROR 1980s was widely used to justify a new emphasis on investment in primary schooling in poor countries. Arguably social rates of return to investment in primary were higher than at other levels in poor countries (Psacharopolous et al 1985) though much of the analysis that
suggested this was later criticised as based on partial and incomplete data with fragile assumptions. Moreover the developmental externalities of primary schooling were thought to be substantial (greater agricultural productivity, lower infant mortality and morbidity etc). It was also believed by some that economic growth (and just possibly improved income distribution, political stability and better governance) would follow from raising the average educational level of the poor through universalising access to primary schooling.

The Jomtien World Conference on Education for All (1990) did confirm a shift of emphasis, at least amongst development partners, away from support for higher level skill development (technical and vocational education, secondary education in science and technology, higher education investment) towards the prioritisation of basic education as a vector for development that could be externally supported. Though this shift took some time to materialise, and was not met with enthusiasm by at least some governments of poor countries, it gathered momentum through the decade. HCT, ROR, and rights and needs based approaches to development and planning came together to push in what appeared to be the same direction as far as educational investment was concerned.

The events that led to Jomtien were also underpinned by a kind of “Washington consensus” (perhaps more a consensus in Washington than elsewhere, and more amongst some development agencies than national governments) that not only could development be accelerated through investments in human capital, but also that the best way forward lay in greater liberalisation of approaches to the delivery of public services and more emphasis on markets whether in education or other sectors. Thatcherism in the UK exported neo-liberalism and the language of competition, sub-contracting, privatisation, target setting, and performativity as applied to public services. This presented planners with new challenges around how and in what ways markets could be managed, how services could be marketised, and how non-government providers could be regulated and facilitated. For some this was contradictory since neo-liberalism implied less rather than more planning in favour of the invisible hands of well behaved markets assuming they existed. One consequence of this may have been for planners and planning to cross more frequently the thresholds from technocratic analysis towards the politics of change and reform, and become actors in policy dialogue with ideology, as well as providers of analysis to inform debate. Planning began to become more politicised as it was linked in to international as well as national concerns (Haddad and Demsky 1995).

By the time of the Dakar World Education Forum in 2000 and the commitment to the Dakar Goals for Education for All a set of priorities and processes had emerged that now shape much planning in poor countries. At Dakar rights based approaches to universalising basic education were given more prominence in the debates than were HCT, ROR and neo-liberalism. It was recognised that equitable access to reasonable quality education remains unavailable to large proportions of the population of many poor countries. This was judged unacceptable, and the obligations of both governments and development partners to deliver on commitments were stressed. The assumptions of social demand planning were prominent, at least for UPE and EFA agendas.

At Dakar the pledge was also made no country seriously committed to Education for All would be thwarted by a lack of resources. The existence of a credible plan was advanced as one indicator of commitment, and a prerequisite for external funding. Who was to judge credibility, on what criteria, was not spelt out. Different agencies had different priorities and
this was seen, at least by some, as “a handicap for the effective dialogue needed at country level” though it was not entirely clear why.

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) promulgated later in 2000 reinforced a restricted agenda for educational development – essentially UPE (later universal basic education) and (quantitative) gender equity – that seem only fit for a limited set of developmental purposes. Planning for economic growth, a necessary condition for sustained delivery of rights to education, increased wellbeing, and reduced dependence, were visible but not prominent as the new Millennium dawned. New growth theory began to offer some alternative insights into “drivers of change” and wealth generation. Accelerating aspects of globalisation began to redraw maps of comparative advantage and viable development strategies, not least because of the geo-political realignments that followed the collapse of the USSR, rapid growth in East Asia and the emergence of the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS), the consequences of the Gulf wars and 9/11, and new concerns for global warming. Economic growth never disappeared from development thinking but for a period it seemed to recede into the background of educational planners concerns.


Against this backdrop of the evolution of educational planning Francoise and I have collaborated on two major books (Lewin and Caillods 2001, and Caillods, Gottelman-Duret, Lewin 1997). Both highlight educational planning and development issues that remain current and invite much more work. A digression is now in order on this special occasion.

After the Jomtien conference it was clear that, though UPE and, more generally, EFA was indeed a priority in those countries farthest from its realisation, development required a balanced pattern of educational investment across educational levels. The increasing emphasis on planning shaped by rights to basic education risked several outcomes. Most obviously rapid growth in access and participation to primary schooling would generate demand for post primary schooling, (and for many new primary teachers who would need to have completed secondary schooling). Without balanced growth in access to secondary transition rates would fall and universal primary completion rates would fail to materialise. But secondary schooling in poor countries was widely expensive both in terms of public costs and to households, unsuited in curriculum and pedagogy to meet the needs of new students drawn from a much wider range of social and economic backgrounds with different capabilities and needs, and not prioritised (indeed barely recognised) in EFA policy dialogue with development partners.

Something else was missing. Though the rights based case to deliver on the right to education for all was unassailable as a principle, in practice it assumed that sufficient resources would be available (indefinitely), that growing aid dependence was not a serious concern, and that growth linked to increased knowledge and skill would occur. But in countries where less than 10% of the labour force had completed secondary schooling successfully it was never clear where such growth would come from, what aspects of national educational investment strategy would support increased value added in knowledge intensive sectors of the economy, and what the opportunity costs would be of privileging the completion of the last child of primary schooling over investment at higher levels. Economic growth would not depend on the enrolments of the most marginalized and most excluded children in primary education. Poverty reduction linked to growth as well as redistribution seemed to require
more equitable access and participation to post primary educational opportunities and specifically to secondary schooling. Who goes to secondary schooling was becoming the key determinant of life futures and there was at least some indirect evidence (the growth of private primary schooling, achievement outcomes strongly skewed by household income) that social polarisation might increase rather than reduce with expanded access to primary schooling whose quality was compromised by rapid growth.

Francoise and I shared the view that a two-pronged approach was needed that did indeed prioritise access to primary education in countries where large numbers were excluded, but which also recognised that post-primary provision would have to grow, and do so at affordable costs. Extensive experience with attempts to massify technical and vocational education at post-primary level in poor countries had generally led to disappointing results. Costs were often very high, effective demand for places was weak, and labour market signals of employability less than convincing. Ways had to be found of making secondary schooling more accessible, more affordable, more relevant and knowledge and skill based, and more attractive. It remained the case the secondary school graduates were invariably more likely to enjoy greater rewards in labour markets (even if their relative advantage fell over time), that various externalities were developmentally beneficial (better health status, lower fertility, lower HIV infection rates), and that international competitiveness to attract FDI and add value in manufacturing and service sector employment almost certainly depended on more rather than less secondary school graduates.

This work analysed the magnitude of growth needed in different countries to reach threshold levels of participation in secondary schooling, and identified the likely costs with and without reforms. Case studies of Anglophone and Francophone countries provided insight into the dynamics of expansion in different contexts and helped answer the question why secondary schooling is so expensive in many poor countries that it cannot be universalised. A raft of policy options were identified that offer the prospect of more affordable access that recognises the demographic challenges and structural constraints. Many questions remain for further research including:

- What can be learnt from EFA and UPE for the expansion of secondary schooling and will the same mistakes be repeated?
- To what extent has expanded secondary schooling improved equity and contributed to poverty reduction in poor households?
- Why has some expanded secondary schooling been ineffective in supporting students to reach levels of achievement reflected in national norms?
- Since who goes to which secondary school is becoming one of the most important determinant of life futures in many poor countries how can access be provided more equitably?
- Why do those who attend secondary schooling have a lower risk of contracting HIV?

The research was undertaken as a multi-country study and published in 2001 as “Financing Secondary Education in Developing Countries; Strategies for Sustainable Growth” by IIEP². The Dakar Strategy Session on “After Primary Education What?” showcased the research and raised the profile of the issues it analysed. Along with a series of journal articles, newsletter items and conference presentations this work succeeded in raising the profile of the case to

rebalance the development agenda set by EFA and the Millennium Development Goals. The World Bank initiated the Secondary Education in Africa (SEIA) in 2002 along with ADEA. Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya and Rwanda have all announced ambitious plans to expand and universalise secondary schooling and have drawn on ideas from the research. Most recently the ADEA biennial in Maputo in 2008 chose post primary schooling as its central theme and considered a sequel to earlier analysis (Lewin 2008). Most development partners now recognise the need to rebalance external assistance to include secondary and other post primary investment, and to link investment to growth as well as the delivery of rights.

The second collaboration is a result of a shared passion to highlight the role of science and technology in development. By the late 1980s it was time to revisit the issues. The 1960s and 70s had seen a lot of activity to promote new science curricula first in OECD countries post Sputnick, and then in newly independent ex-colonies. UNESCO supported the development of curriculum development centres throughout the developing world and most if not all prioritised science and technology as an area of investment. There was considerable energy and momentum behind introducing new ways of teaching science and technology using more guided discovery, simple but intellectually challenging practical work, and content related to context and likely life futures. Investments in TVET had proved disappointing at secondary school level an often unattractive to the more capable.

At the same time the role of science and technology in development was manifest. Especially in East Asia a strong base of knowledge and skill in science and technology were at the core of the growth on new industries and new products with high knowledge content and value added. Economies that built on the ability of science and technology to improve productivity, innovate process and products, and systematically accumulate capability seemed to fare better than those that did not, at least in cases where growth was driven by manufactured exports and capturing more value from natural resources.

However, TIMSS and other studies had begun to show how large were the gaps in science achievement between rich and poor countries. Access to post primary science education remained the preserve of small elites in poor countries. Primary science was becoming more common in the curriculum but difficult to roll out effectively across poorly resources school systems. Complaints backed by analyses continued to highlight poor quality, and recall and memory dominated learning and teaching, despite years of curriculum development. High cost laboratory based methods of teaching at secondary level persisted despite little evidence that they provided value for money or convincing achievement gains consonant with costs.

It was time to develop a strand of work to revitalise the policy and planning debates around investment in science education and to revisit and build on earlier work in UNESCO that had lost momentum. The result was a series of studies across more than twelve countries coordinated from IIEP. A special in depth case study developed a programme of research in Malaysia, a country that had invested heavily in transforming the quality of its science education (Lewin and Maimunah,1993).

The research provided a status report on science education in different countries, identified key issues including policy and practice on specialisation, recruitment and option choices, curriculum reform, the role of practical activity, assessment, language issues, and teacher training, analysed costs in relation to strategy on tracking and specialisation, laboratory provision, training and equipment, develop an inventory of planning data and methods, and mapped out policy relevant conclusions to inform national planning.
The research broke new ground in providing a comprehensive overview of the issues and the evidence that could inform policy dialogue. It provided insights and raised questions for further research including:

- How can a better match be achieved between the outputs of schools systems of qualified science graduates at different levels and the labour market?
- To what extent can technologising science education (i.e. including technological thinking skills in science education) be a more cost effective option than specialised TVET at secondary level?
- Why is science education expensive and does it have to be?
- Is laboratory based secondary science value for money?
- Why is it so difficult to move science education away from recall based didactic teaching?
- How best can assessment and examinations be used to lever curriculum change?

The outputs of the research were published in 1997 by Pergamon and IIEP as *Science Education and Development; Planning and Policy Issues at Secondary Level*. Various workshops and seminars were organised in the mid 1990s including a regional event in South Africa. The findings were disseminated through IIEP events and to trainees on the annual training programmes. Extensions of the work were used by the WBI in international workshops in 2000 (Lewin 2000).

**Whither Educational Planning?**

Planners seek to foresee the future so here are some glimpses into a crystal ball. Several factors will influence educational planning over the next decades which include the following.

First, globalisation in its many forms has become a pervasive reality. It has many ramifications for national education systems from the need to respond to internationalised qualifications systems and labour markets to the increased visibility of rights based advocacy groups calling for greater monitoring and transparency and access to data. Global agendas from Jomtien to Dakar and the Millennium Development Goals have been promoted by powerful multi-lateral agencies, development partners, (I)NGOS and CSOs. A common language has developed around EFA. National planning systems with limited capacity have been heavily skewed towards EFA Goals and MDG related activities. Sub-sectors not within EFA have been neglected and data collection systems have been allowed to degrade in non-EFA areas (e.g. on secondary schooling, private schools, higher and further education, NFE). New balances need to be struck that reflect the demands and pressures that globalisation generates.

Second, external assistance programmes are becoming more homogeneous. This is partly the result of the development of sector approaches coordinating the resources of several development partners. Various benchmarks and indicative frameworks now exist that

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generate convergent forms of planning, at least at national level e.g., the requirements for PRSPs and for “credible plans” as a precondition for external financing and for the Fast Track Initiative (Caillods and Hallak 2005), and the development of Sector Wide programme support modalities (Buchert 2000). Conditions placed on external assistance often require verifiable indicators of performance to release funds. The targets and indicators chosen are usually derived from EFA Goals and the MDGs. More often than not they tend to be normative (based on best practice, selective comparisons with “successful countries”, and convenient rules of thumb). They are also formative in that they compress complex system realities into aggregate and homogenising policy and practice (e.g. conditionalities on the proportion of the education budget allocated to primary, suggested proportions of private provision, average pupil teacher ratios). “Cookie cutters” do exist and often reflect procedural requirements that have little sensitivity to context. More differentiated approaches to planning are surely needed.

Third, it needs to be remembered the MDGs and EFA Goals are lists rather than recipes. Achieving all the EFA Goals and education related MDGs may indeed be desirable. However achieving all the Goals is no guarantee that development will take place in an efficient and sustainable way. Nor was it the basis for a strategy followed by any OECD country or for that matter the Asian tiger economies. Collectively the MDGs do not provide a recipe for growth on which the sustained delivery of rights almost certainly depends. The coverage of the Goals is partial and the Goals chosen might well have looked different if the lists had been generated in 2008. The specification of the Goals is blind to interaction, interdependence and sequencing, and offers no guidance on the prioritisation that all real world governments have to confront. Critically the Goals are not distributional in character – a major omission if equity is a central concern, poverty is partly the product of wealth and its distribution, and educational access is strongly associated with household income. The challenge for planners is to step outside the straight jacket of EFA and the MDGs, revisit their form and substance with the benefit of some hindsight, and engage in a more balanced way with national development strategies that must balance needs for growth with the delivery of rights.

Fourth, EFA and the MDGs have encouraged the growth of aspirational planning (Lewin 2007). As Figure 1 illustrates, aspirational planning sets desired goals in the future (e.g. Net Enrolment Rate (NER) = 100%, gender parity, 100% primary completion etc.). Projection models are then used to draw back a pathway to the present which indicates what needs to be achieved each year to stay on track. The pathway is often linear, though the real world rarely is. It defines year by year milestones against which progress can be measured and, in many cases, these are used to shape tranche release conditions for funding.
What often happens in practice is that financial constraints (time slippage related to agreeing plans, signing off agreements, disbursing tranches of funding etc) and non financial constraints (lead times on construction, teacher training, agreement to appoint and post new teachers, softening of demand to enroll etc.) lead to under achievement below the on-track line. The gradient of what needs to be achieved then steepens progressively to the point where the planning and implementation system enters a Zone of Improbable Progress (ZIP). Either the targets and related goals fall into disrepute because they are unachievable and there is no confidence in the modalities of making more and more rapid progress, or the targets and goals are redefined and time shifted forward sometimes with indecent haste, as happened with the gender parity goals for 2005.

Target generating planning may be an alternative (Lewin 2007). This can be based on estimates of the highest sustainable rate of expansion that does not degrade quality to unacceptable levels. It offers a better basis for operational plans and mobilizing assets efficiently and effectively at a pace which is feasible. It allows different time scales for different starting points and contexts. It depends on forward projections that draw attention to critical limitations of capacity, infrastructure and finance, and identifies commitments and liabilities generated by present actions.

Fifth, information technology and cheap, local, portable and powerful computers continue to transform the technologies of planning and data capture and analysis. New kinds of school mapping have become possible using GPS technology. Decentralised access to educational planning data on schools, teachers, and students for local use is feasible. National data sets and projections can be made available to wider audiences. Assessment data allows detailed performance analysis down to the level of individual candidates, and facilitates the generation of school league tables and insights into school effectiveness. New information technology facilitates new forms of micro-planning at the local level. It also makes it much easier to explore data in different ways, not least to explore distribution and equity issues below national level.
But there are risks. False promises for the capabilities and costs of EMIS systems are not uncommon. Data systems may become so complex that only a handful of highly skilled software engineers understand them and this limits ownership and accessibility. How to take advantage of new technical possibilities, yet allow at least some of the architecture of planning and the data on which it depends to be transparent, accessible to stakeholders, and at least partly open access is a pressing challenge. Paradoxically as the technology of data processing has improved, in some countries the quality of the data input has deteriorated as has the lag in finalising data sets.

Sixth, systems theory approaches to planning have been unfashionable for some time. But their underlying power means that they should not be ignored. Education systems are indeed systems with many constituent parts. Often the best explanations of their behaviour are not those related to policy intervention, but those which are an expression of underlying effective demand, and the actions of many independent actors making choices. These can be treated statistically. They are subject to a systems analytic frame of reference that often has predictive power. It may be that as these attributes are rediscovered by new generations of planners the techniques associated with the approach will find new favour.

Seventh, through the 1990s, and partly as a result of the changes indicated above, educational planning has expanded its scope to include nonformal initiatives, growing concerns for quality, examinations and selection, and implementation (Hallak, 1995). Most recently educational planners have begun to engage more directly with what is loosely called “policy dialogue” and which leads towards planning as a political activity as well as a technical one. Clearly where there is too much distance between planners, policymakers, politicians and systems for implementation, risks are high (Little 2008). Where target setters and target getters live in different worlds, ownership of problems and performance will be weak. Engagement of planners with political systems is rational and desirable, not least to moderate unrealistic political ambitions. However, governments and agencies have learnt how to politicise technical advice to support partisan positions. This has been fuelled by increasing numbers of communications professionals, special advisors and “spin doctors” whose concerns may be very different from educational planners. Exploring the blurred boundary between planning, policy making and politics is a new challenge for educational planners. And one which needs planners to constantly resist the triumph of ideologically driven advocacy over analysis, and to become politicised. But perhaps that is too idealistic.

Concluding Remark

Educational planning will continue to evolve both in its techniques and in its applications. It will continue to help identify the room to manoeuvre in policy with due regard to uncertainty, controllability and locus of control (Lewin 1987). Planners will need to remain courageous when pressured to produce analysis that suits political preferences but does violence to underlying realities and causal relationships. Planners should also remember that innovation is needed in education systems that fail to deliver equitably an acceptable quality of service. But innovation is disruptive, resource consuming, and unevenly implemented. As a result, in the short term, innovation can adversely affect the equitable delivery of a service at an acceptable level of quality. Even planned change may make some things worse before they get better, unplanned change often does this. This “planners paradox” (Lewin, 1991) will remain true and is a reminder to support innovations and reform with evidence, and resist
temptations to blow with the winds of political fashion to promote tempting but unattainable and unsustainable outcomes.

Planning can be seen as substituting error for risk. Planners and planning can indeed be wrong (flawed technical analysis, unrealistic assumptions, rigid adherence to out of date strategies). In another sense planning is bound to be wrong in so far as any and every plan will be overtaken sooner or later by events that change key assumptions and create the need for iteration and updating. Without planning there are the much greater problems of the risks associated with judgements and decisions over influenced by short term political events, populist slogans, causal empiricism, and arbitrary preferences. As a Nigerian colleague puts it “to fail to plan is to plan to fail”.

For those who believe that real politik has superseded analysis Keynes’ defence of economics is apposite. “Practical men, who believe themselves to be exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler a few years back….. there are not many who are influenced by new theories after they are 25 or 30 years of age….soon or late, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or evil” Keynes 1936:363)

Francoise’s long career has touched many different aspect of educational planning. Her approach has valued evidence alongside insight, pragmatism over polemics, and the politics of the possible. Her legacy is secure through the extent to which these attributes are embedded in the traditions of educational planning that IIEP has established.
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